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Abstract:  
Price rigidity is often modeled by assuming that firms face a fixed cost of price change. 
However, in surveys, firms report that the main reason they wish to keep prices stable is 
for fear of antagonizing customers. Moreover, marketing studies show that most 
consumers engage in very little product comparison on a typical shopping trip. In this 
paper, we explore the implications of these observations for price rigidity. In our model, 
comparing prices and characteristics of alternative brands is time-consuming. While 
some consumers behave as bargain hunters with zero opportunity cost form shopping, 
most are loyal to firms as long as posted prices are not raised. A price increase is 
interpreted as a signal that a better alternative may be available and triggers consumer 
search. Firms do not face menu costs and are free to change nominal prices, but 
understand that their pricing decisions will affect their customer base and hence future 
profits. We show that this micro-founded mechanism is akin to a nominal rigidity and 
naturally generates price stickiness. It is also compatible with the observation of frequent 
sales at the retail level and can rationalize the decreasing or flat hazard functions 
observed empirically. 
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1 Introduction
Standard macroeconomic models require nominal rigidities to generate real e¤ects
from monetary shocks. In addition, the degree of price rigidity has rst-order conse-
quences on the dynamic properties of such models. While a large body of research has
evolved on the topic of price rigidity, both empirically and theoretically, a consensus
on the main factors behind the observed stability of prices in micro data remains
elusive.
In the context of macroeconomic models, attempts at generating price stickiness
in the face of shocks have generally taken one of three forms. Originally and still up
to this day, nominal rigidities have been modelled as reduced-form mechanisms such
as Calvo pricing, also called time-dependent mechanisms. Here, the probability that
a given rm is allowed to reset prices is exogenous and outside of its control. While
this mechanism has had some success for aggregate analysis, it is not based on micro
foundations and cannot explain some of the micro stylized facts present in the data
(see Bils and Klenow, 2004, and Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).
Structural attempts at modeling this type of friction have mostly taken the form
of menu costs. Under this state-dependent mechanism, the rm faces a xed cost
to changing its nominal price and optimally chooses the moment of doing so. The
modelling device naturally gives rise to sticky prices, i.e. periods during which prices
remain unchanged. It does not however rationalize the presence of very frequent sales
in the data, and requires additional assumptions in order to generate signicant real
e¤ects from monetary shocks (see Golosov and Lucas, 2006, and Midrigan, 2011).
More recently, models incorporating informational frictions on the side of rms have
been proposed in order to generate price rigidity (see Mankiw and Reis, 2002, as well
as Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009).
Despite the fact that menu costs and costly information have been the two main
micro-founded mechanisms used in macro models, based on survey evidence rms in
real life appear to give little weight to these two factors as reasons for keeping prices
stable (see for example Blinder et al., 1998, and Fabiani et al., 2005). Instead, they
emphasize concerns such as losing/angering customers or market share, considerations
which have received very little attention in the price rigidity literature aside a few
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exceptions. For example, Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009) embed customer switching
costs in an otherwise standard macro framework. They show that the resulting cus-
tomer base dynamics impact the pricing decision of the rm and lead to more stable
prices in the face of shocks. There are two limitations however. First, the mechanism
leads to real instead of nominal rigidity. Second, unless it is paired with some menu
cost, it does not generate prices which are sticky, i.e. that stay constant for prolonged
periods of time. The current paper addresses these two issues.
Rotemberg (2005) uses a reduced-form specication to model the concept of al-
truism or fair pricing. In the model consumers see a rm as "altruistic" if it does
maximize a mixture of prots and consumer utility. More specically, consumers get
signals about the rms marginal cost. Using this information, they assess whether
a price increase is "fair". If the consumer views the price as unfair, it stops buying
the good. In other words, in the consumers mind, price increases which do not cor-
respond to cost increases are likely to trigger anger and a large drop in sales. This
gives rise to threshold e¤ects, insofar as consumers react very strongly (stop buying)
as soon as the fairness condition is not met.
In more recent work, Rotemberg (2010) studies a framework akin to consumer
regret. For example, a consumer who observes a price increase for a storable good
may regret not having bought more of it in the past. Conversely, a price fall may
trigger regret for not having waited to buy. This idea is modelled in a reduced form
way by assuming that consumers incur a cost whenever a price is changed (the cost
is a function of the size of the price change). In order for this feaure to a¤ect the
pricing decision, the objective function is then altered to directly include a notion
of altruism: the rm maximizes a weighted function of its prots and its customers
utility. This naturally means that the "regret cost" (the cost of a price change for the
consumer) is now internalized by the rm. The result is something akin to a menu
cost, which is always positive and increasing in the size of the price change. Hence,
nominal price stickiness follows naturally. Arseneau and Chugh (2007) also explore
the role of fairness issues in a search-based environment with bargaining and show
that price rigidity can arise endogeneously, while Nakamura and Steinsson (2011)
show that sticky prices can be an equilibrium in a setting with internal deep habits.
The contribution of this paper is to o¤er a micro-founded mechanism which gen-
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erates nominal price rigidity and rationalizes rms revealed concerns about price
changes potentially antagonizing customers, without relying on concepts of altruism
or fairness. The otherwise standard macro model is based on a basic fact: comparing
products, brands or even stores takes time and resources. It is particularly true of
products which are purchased frequently. For example, consider a consumer who goes
to the grocery store on a weekly basis to purchase a basket composed of multiple
types of goods. In the event that he decides to actively shop for, say, toothpaste, he
must compare brands and products across at least two dimensions, prices and char-
acteristics (summarized by product-specic taste shocks in our specication). Having
chosen the option with the highest utility, he moves on to the next good. Clearly,
active comparison shopping is not something he can realistically perform for most
goods purchased on a given trip to the grocery store. On the next occasion, he must
decide whether to take time to compare once again toothpaste brands, or instead to
simply purchase his "home brand", i.e. the one he purchased in the past. In our
model, positive shopping/search costs imply that the optimal consumer strategy is
to use the nominal price of the home brand as a signal. If it rose since the price
originally paid (the "reference price"), the customer scans the shelves to see whether
a better alternative exists. If the price did not increase, he instead remains loyal
to the brand. This is because absent any new information regarding the evolution
of the distribution of product prices and characteristics, the consumer continues to
believe that the brand he originally chose remains his best choice. And updating
beliefs about the distribution would in turn require actively comparing products, a
costly action.
We show that modifying the consumer problem along the lines just described
generates signicant nominal price stickiness even in the case of economy-wide shocks.
That is, even if all its competitors have been hit by a similar positive shock, a rm is
reluctant to raise its nominal price by fear of triggering search from its loyal customers.
Not only are prices sticky, but the framework is in line with some well documented
features of the data. First, unlike menu cost models, it is compatible with the presence
of frequent temporary sales. A price fall will not lead loyal customers to react in our
model: they will only see the sale price as a "bonus", making their home brand even
more attractive. Second, our mechanism rationalizes the declining or at hazard
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functions observed in micro price data. As the rm maintains prices constant, it
attracts new customers and retains its loyal clientele. Consequently, its customer
base grows larger, making a price increase ever costlier and hence less likely, until the
markup has become too small to bear. Third, the mechanism gives rise to the well
documented rockets and feathersphenomenon: prices rise faster following positive
cost shocks than they fall as costs go down (see Peltzman, 2000, for evidence from
multiple markets).
Our framework is related to the large literature in marketing on the concept of
reference price, i.e the price to which consumers consciously or unconsciously com-
pare the current observed store price. There is evidence that customers carry around
an internal reference price: instead of re-optimizing at each shopping trip for every
product by comparing brand prices, consumers tend to remember the last nominal
price paid (reference price) and then compare it to the current price (see for example
Kalyanaram and Little, 1994, Briesch et al., 1997, and Mazumbar et al., 2005). In
line with our model, researchers in this eld have identied the opportunity cost of
constantly re-optimizing as a factor behind this empirical nding. Also, the fact that
rising prices triggers search has been documented by Lewis (2011) in the gasoline
market: he nds that tra¢ c on the price comparison website www.gasbuddy.com is
signicantly higher in periods when gas prices are on the rise.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describe the economic environment
as well as the maximization problems faced by households and rms. In Section 3
we analyze the optimal pricing decision of the rm in a partial equilibrium setting,
while the mechanism is embedded within a general equilibrium framework in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivating evidence and literature
In order to explain the high degree of price rigidity present in the micro data (see
Carlton, 1986, for early evidence, and more recently Bils and Klenow, 2005, or Naka-
mura and Steinsson, 2009) economists have used a variety of mechanisms in their
models. The two most common ways of modelling nominal price rigidity have been
to implement time-dependent pricing a la Calvo, or assume the existence of menu
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costs.
Table 1 reports some evidence from Fabiani et al. (2005). It gathers and sum-
marizes the results from a number of price-setting surveys regarding the relative
importance of various theories of price rigidity. The striking feature behind this ev-
idence is the importance that rms attach to factors linked to customer relations,
despite the fact that the actual theory this category refers to may di¤er across sur-
veys. For example, it includes the desire of sellers to maintain market share or a fear
that changing prices may antagonize customers and disrupt long-term relationhips
with the loyal clientele (see Okun, 1981). Blinder et al. (1998) observe that rms
often volunteer similar explanations when asked open-ended questions on price rigid-
ity. While it might be di¢ cult to determine which of these variants is most relevant,
our emphasis on factors related to customer base appears clearly in line with rms
actual concerns.
TABLE 1
Theories behind price rigidity
Euro US CA SW UK BE ES FR NL AT PT
Customer relations 1 4 2 1 5 1 1 4 1 1 1
Menu costs 8 6 10 11 11 9 6 6 7 8 7
Costly information 9 - 10 13 - 8 7 - - 7 -
# of theories 10 12 11 13 11 10 9 7 8 10 9
Note: Rank of di¤erent theories based on rm surveys.
Source: Fabiani et al. (2005)
Paradoxically, the two mechanisms which have probably garnered the most atten-
tion in the state-dependent literature on price stickiness are considered less important
by rms. When managers are asked whether price rigidity might be the product of
menu costs or costly information gathering, they invariably rank such theories very
low.1 There is also evidence that the degree of price rigidity is related to customer
1One may rightly argue that menu costs could be interpreted more generally as inclusive of
customer-related costs. Yet in the way they are modelled in modern macroeconomic models, they
would then represent a very crude reduced form. At a minimum, they would not take into account
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base concerns. The survey on price-setting conducted in Canada by Amirault, Kwan
and Wilkinson (2006) o¤ers evidence that there is a signicant correlation between
the importance of customer relations and price stickiness. They report that cus-
tomer relations costs have a very high level of acknowledgement among rms with
the stickiest prices. Seventy-six per cent of rms who change their prices only once or
not at all during the year recognize this factor as a source of price rigiditycompared
with 37% who adjust prices more than 52 times a year. This di¤erence is statistically
signicant. Not surprisingly, rms with a higher fraction of repeat customers are also
those who are more concerned about factors linked to customer relations (see for ex-
ample Apel, Friberg and Hallsten, 2005, or Hall, Walsh and Yates, 1997). In addition,
there is evidence that rms with a higher proportion of repeat customers tend to have
more rigid prices. Aucremanne and Druant (2005) nd that 43% of sticky-price rms
have more than 50% of repeat customers, versus 28% for exible-price rms.
Laboratory studies have also found evidence that price rigidity is more pronounced
in the customer market than in an anonymous market. Cason and Friedman (2002)
report that in their experiment, when sellers and buyers enter long-term relationships
(here because customers face some costs of switching supplier), sellers will often absorb
a portion of their cost changes in order to preserve their customer base. Similarly,
Renner and Tyran (2004) nd that many sellers do not respond to the cost shock
by increasing prices [...] because they hope to reap the gains from trading with loyal
customers in the remaining periods of the game.
While macroeconomists have paid little attention to the interaction between cus-
tomer base and pricing, it is at the center of a large literature in marketing. In our
model, the price previously paid becomes a reference price against which the currently
posted price is compared. An important empirical literature in marketing has looked
at the role of reference-price e¤ects in consumer decisions. Most applications have
used past prices as a proxy for the reference price (see for example Lattin and Bucklin
1989, Hardie et al. 1993, or Kalyanaram and Little 1994) and have found that such
models yield signicant improvements in t. In addition, testing for the predictions
of Kahneman and Tverskys (1979, 1991) prospect theory, numerous studies have
the dynamic dimension of customer base (i.e. long term impact of losing customers), an aspect
which is at the heart of rmsanswers in surveys.
7
documented an asymmetric response of sales to price cuts and price increases (e.g.
Briesch et al., 2000), sometimes also called sticker shock e¤ect.
Marketing research has almost exclusively looked into the relationship between
reference price and brand choice. Yet, at its core, our mechanism is one where devia-
tions of a price from its reference point is linked to search activity, which may or may
not ultimately lead to brand switching. Yuan and Han (2011) show using market
experiments that participants are more likely to search following price increases than
decreases. In turn, this makes it optimal for sellers to raise prices drastically when
they do so, but only slowly reduce prices in order to limit consumer search, a dynamic
akin to the rockets and feathersphenomenon found in many markets (Peltzman,
2000). This result in a controlled environment is in line with the ndings of Lewis
(2009) in the gasoline market. He shows that tra¢ c on www.gasbuddy.com, a price
comparison website, is signicantly higher in periods when gas prices are on the rise.
Finally, it is also important to note that a number of well-documented pricing
strategies by rms are compatible with this type of mechanism. For example, pro-
ducers and retailers often announce pre-emptively price hikes and provide the reasons
behind the move, such as blaming the rise in the price of cotton for an increase in
the prices of apparel. By appealing to aggregate forces to explain its action, a rm
may hope that consumers will interpret this situation as not rm-specic, hence min-
imizing the risk of customers switching brand or store. This would be consistent
with the evidence from Gagnon (2009) who shows that in Mexico, a VAT increase
led to a fast and widespread adjustment of prices across the economy. Also, limited
attention by consumers rationalizes the frequent strategy of keeping prices constant
while decreasing package size, as well as the heavy use of advertising alongside price
drops.
3 The model
The economy is composed of a continuum of sectors/categories, each producing a
product indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. In each sector, there is an innite number of rms,
each selling a distinct brand k 2 [0; 1]. Next we describe the optimization problems
of the households and rms.
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3.1 Households
Each household derives disutility from labor L and utility from a basket of products
C, and solves the following problem:
maxU j0 = E0
1X
t=0
tu (Ct; Lt)
u (Ct; Lt) =
(Ct)
1 
1     
(Lt)
1+
1 + 
subject to
PtCt + E0rt+1bt+1 = bt + wtLt + t
where E is the expectation operator and  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, or risk aversion parameter. The household supplies homogenous
labor and earns the economy-wide nominal wage rate wt. Households also have access
to complete state-contingent claims markets. The stochastic discount factor is given
by rt+1 such that Etrt+1b
j
t+1 is the price at time 0 of a random payment b
j
t+1 in period
t+ 1 (we also impose a no-Ponzi-game constraint). Each household receives an equal
share of the period t prots from the rms, t.
For expositional purposes and because the labor decision is standard, we focus
in this section on the consumption problem of a representative household. In each
period the consumer derives ow utility from a basket of products according to a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator,
Ct =
Z 1
0
c
 1

j;t dj
 
 1
where j denotes a category (e.g. sliced bread, cereal, orange juice, etc.) and  is the
elasticity of substitution across categories. This implies that the budget constraint
can also be written asZ 1
0
pj;tcj;t + E0rt+1bt+1 = bt + wtLt + t
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Within each category j there exists a continuum of brands which are valued by
each consumer according to
cj;t =
Z 1
0
(k;j;t)

 1 ck;j;tdk
where ck;j;t corresponds to the quantity consumed of brand k in category j in period
t. The consumer values brands di¤erently based on taste shocks  drawn from a
time-invariant distribution with cdf F. The exponent on the taste shock is inconse-
quential and included only to ease exposition later on. Taste shocks here represent
heterogenous preferences across consumers along various product characteristics (e.g.
fat content, texture, presence of bleach). This setup implies that di¤erent products
within a category are perfect substitutes (in the sense of having an elasticity of sub-
stitution equal to innity), but have di¤erent valuations k;j;t. In this context, and
absent any constraint to brand switching, it is optimal for the consumer to choose
every period the brand with the highest taste-to-price ratio.
From the households problem, the optimality conditions with respect to Lt and
bt+1 are standard. The rst-order condition with respect to product j (assuming it
chose brand ) yields:
(Ct)
1

  ;j;t (c;j;t)
  1
 = tp;j;t (3.1)
where t is the multiplier on the households budget constraint and pj;t is the price
of the chosen brand k. Hence the households demand is zero for all brands except
the one with the highest taste-to-price ratio:
c;j;t =

p;j;t
;j;tPt
 
Ct
The price index Pt as well as the aggregate basket Ct are household specic since
households potentially face di¤erent prices and taste shocks. However, in the sym-
metric equilibrium, this will no longer be the case. Also, once we move to the problem
of the rm, we will drop the taste shocks from the demand schedules for expositonal
purposes. They are irrelevant for pricing dynamics in our case since symmetry across
brands implies that the composition of consumers (and their demand levels) will be
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similar across rms.
3.1.1 Search framework
As we already mentioned, if the consumer did not face any search cost, he would
every period compare all brands within each category j and choose the brand with
the highest taste/price ratio k;j;t=pk;j;t. In reality, however, search or shopping costs
are arguably non-negligible: for example, given the array of choices available for each
product category in a typical grocery store, consumers cannot realistically spend time
comparing all brands on a weekly basis.
For these reasons, we introduce in our model a positive shopping cost, s. That is,
in a given period there is a time/xed cost associated with learning about the price
distribution and then comparing personal preferences across brands within a category.
As long as the consumer purchases the same brand he purchased in the previous
period, this cost is avoided. As an example, consider a shopper who is approaching
the toothpaste aisle at the supermarket. The consumer locates the brand he usually
buys and sees its price. He then needs to decide whether to simply purchase the same
brand again, or start comparing all brands on display along both the price and taste
dimensions.2
For tractability reasons we model the search cost as reducing directly the utility
contribution of the category in question. Hence, letting hj;t = 1 if search is happening
in category j at time t, the consumption aggregate can be expressed as:
Ct =
Z 1
0
(1  s)hj;t c
 1

j;t dj
 
 1
We now turn formally to the decision of a household to engage in active comparison
shopping for an isolated product category . If the consumer decides not to search,
he simply continues to enjoy the utility attached to the brand previously bought.
Formally, the value at time t of not engaging in comparison shopping for category 
is given by
W ns;t = u (Ct; Lt; h;t = 0)
2One would expect heterogeneity across households in terms of search costs. In the full version
of the model we also introduce a mass of bargain hunters with zero opportunity cost of shopping.
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where time-t ow utility was dened earlier. Alternatively, if the consumer decides
to incur the shopping cost s, he sees the entire continuum of brand prices, pk;;t,
and draws brand-specic taste shocks, k;;t. By the law of large numbers, the entire
distribution of taste shocks is realized. Hence, the expected value of doing comparison
shopping is given by
W st = Etu (Ct; Lt; h;t = 1)
The consumer will decide to search if:
W st > W
ns
t
Notice that since we study the decision to search for category j in isolation, the only
uncertainty that matters is the one related to the utility the consumer expects to
obtain if it were to incur the search cost and engage in active shopping in category .
Given the specication of our utility function, the decision rule therefore boils down
to a simple comparison at the category level:3
Et

(1  s) c
 1

;t

> c
 1

;t
Et
24(1  s)  pk;;t
k;;tPt
 
Ct
!  1

35 >  (;;t)  p;;t
Pt
 
Ct
!  1

(1  s)Et
"
k;;t
pk;;t
 1#
>

;;t
p;;t
 1
Notice that because of our directed search setting, the expected utility from shop-
ping is actually determined by the maximal taste-to-price ratio the consumer after
comparing price and product characteristics. Hence, for a small enough search cost s,
the consumer will decide to shop if he expects to nd a brand with a higher taste-to-
price ratio than the one he is currently consuming. But when it was initially chosen
 periods ago, the current brand itself represented the highest taste-to-price ratio
available.
3To see this, one simply needs to write down the full expression for the ow utility at time t and
realize that all terms except the one associated with the utility contribution of category .
12
Therefore, it is optimal for the consumer to remain loyal to the brand he has
been purchasing as long as the price p;;t is not increased above the "reference price"
p;;t  , that is the price at which the consumer originally purchased the product in
period t  . Indeed, if p;;t is lower or equal than the consumers reference price, then
based on his beliefs about the price distribution the "next best brand" is now even less
interesting in relative terms. Hence, as long as the price does not rise, the consumer
will continue purchasing the same brand unless there is exogenous separation or if he
gets exogeneous information regarding changes in the price distribution.
However, if p;j;t does increase above the reference price p;;t  , barring any new
information regarding the price distribution over the previous  periods the consumer
now believes by continuity that there exists a brand out there which is at least slightly
better in the taste/price ratio dimension. Given a search cost small enough, he
has an incentive to shop, learn the time-t price distribution, compare products and
potentially switch brand.4
3.1.2 Discussion
Given our primary interest in price rigidity, so far we have focused on the optimal
response of a customer to movements in the price of his home brand. Before moving
on to the pricing decision of the rm, we highlight a number of other potentially
interesting implications of our reference price setting.
First, consider a category-wide positive cost shock. In our environment, an indi-
vidual rm raising its price would have an incentive to communicate to its customers
that the shock is common to all rms in the sector. By doing so, it will change the
beliefs of consumers about the price distribution and minimize the search response of
its customer base.
Second, because the reference point is dened along the price dimension, rms may
4We are making the implicit assumption that the consumer picks the brand with the highest
taste-to-price ratio based on todays prices only. Yet, with positive search costs, expectations about
future prices for each brand should enter the decision process. This is, unfortunately, a very complex
problem to solve. One realistic way to rationalize our modelling assumption would be to introduce
some xed cost of computing expectations about future prices for all available brands. Also, this
issue is unlikely to be of signicant importance in our setup since shopping costs will be assumed to
be very small. A rm therefore has very limited ability to raise prices in the future to take advantage
of locked-in loyal customers.
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have an incentive to change product attributes instead of prices. Take the example of
a 15 oz. cereal box with a posted price of $3, or 20 cents per ounce. In our framework,
a consumer is more likely to react to an increase in the price to $3.75 than a change
in package size to 12 oz., even though the price-per-pound increase in both cases is
the same.
Third, the presence of temporary price cuts (sales) does not trigger search in
our model: the customer only sees the price cut as a bonus which makes the brand
even more interesting than before. Hence, as we will discuss later, our mechanism is
compatible with the observation of frequent temporary sales in the data.
Fourth, limited attention by consumers implies a potentially strong role for ad-
vertising by rms in order to shape consumersbeliefs about the price distribution.
3.2 Firms
A brand k in category j is produced by a single-product rm. In each category there
are two types of rms denoted by A and B, with a continuum of brands of each type.
All rms of a given type are identical and share the same technology (marginal cost).
Hence they will all be charging the same price and, by the law of large numbers
applied to taste parameters, have the same customer base in equilibrium.
In order to focus on the important elements of the framework, we present the
canonical form of the model and postpone discussion of additional elements to future
sections. The basic problem of the rm in its recursive rm is given by
max
pt
Vt = (pt   ct) qt + EtVt+1
where pt, ct, and qt are the price, marginal cost and quantity sold at time t respectively.
To simplify the exposition we leave aside for now the production dimension and do
not include the brand/type/category subscripts.
In line with the consumer setup described in the previous section, a prot-maximizing
rm needs to keep track of vintages of consumers indexed by when they rst purchased
the rms brand. This information is central to determining what will be the impact
of the pricing decision on the rms customer base. Leaving aside brand/category sub-
scripts for clarity purposes, denote by m the mass of customers of vintage  , those
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who rst bought from the rm  periods ago at price pt  (the "reference price" from
the point of view of these consumers). If we denote by ut the number of units bought
by each consumer, then the total quantity sold by the rm is equal to
qt = ut
 
m0t +
X
=1
I (pt  pt  )mt
!
(3.2)
This expression follows from the consumer problem described earlier. As an ex-
ample consider the case of  = 1. Here m1t corresponds to the mass of customers who
rst bought the rms brand the previous period, at price pt 1. If period-t price is
lower or equal than pt 1, these customers will remain loyal and continue to purchase
the same brand: having already chosen the best taste/price ratio during their com-
parison shopping last period, the current price cannot make them worse o¤ and it is
therefore optimal for them not to incur the positive shopping cost. Alternatively, if
pt > pt 1, by continuity consumers know that there exists a better brand out there.
With a low enough shopping cost s, they decide to compare brands according to the
framework described in the previous section. The same logic applies to older vintages
 = 2; 3; ::: Note that the mechanism is linked to nominal price levels, not relative
prices. This is due to consumers not updating beliefs about the price distribution
unless they pay the shopping cost and actually take the time required to compare
competing brands.
The variable m0t has been isolated in expression (3.2) because it does not refer
to loyal customers but instead new arrivals. Denote by St the mass of unattached
shoppers in the economy: they are consumers who decided to do comparison shopping
following price hikes. Based on the price charged by the rm (pt) and the distribution
of prices in the category (Fpt), a fraction f (pt; Fpt) of St will pick the brand in
question. To summarize, the complete rm problem in its general form is given by
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max
pt
Vt = (pt   ct)ut
 
m0t +
X
=1
I (pt  pt  )mt
!
+ EtVt+1
subject to
m0t = Stf (pt; Fpt)
m+1t+1 = I (pt  pt  )mt
where the last line represents the law of motion of the customer base.
In the next section we study the rms optimal pricing decision under this setup.
In particular, we show that price stickiness is an equilibrium outcome of our model.
4 Price stickiness with reference prices
4.1 A numerical example using the basic framework
We rst solve numerically the problem of a typical rm and show simulations for
the optimal price path in the wake of an idiosyncratic shock, holding the aggregate
and sectoral state variables constant. Then, we look at the nominal nature of our
friction by analyzing the response to a shock that would a¤ect all nominal variables
proportionately in our economy. In addition, we discuss why the presence of sales
is compatible with our mechanism. Finally, the basic model is enhanced in order
to study more specically the role of customer base dynamics, and trend ination is
introduced.
First, we simplify the general version of the model to minimize the number of
state variables. To do so, we assume that loyal customers draw a zero shopping cost
(s = 0) every other period, at which point they automatically shop across brands.
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Consequently, the rm needs only to keep track of a single vintage of loyal customers:
max
p
V
 
c; p 1;m1

= (p  c)u m0 + I (p  p 1)m1+ EV c0; p;m10 ;
subject to
m0 = Sf (p; Fp)
m1
0
= m0
c0 2 fc0; c1; c2g
where the variables have been described earlier. For the current analysis we treat c,
S and Fp as xed parameters, and the per consumer demand function is of the CES
type: u = (p=P ) , where P is a price aggregate and  is the elasticity of substitution
across categories. Also in this particular case it is clearer if we dene a new variable
A which corresponds to the mass of new consumer arrivals, i.e. A = m0 = Sf (p; Fp).
For the numerical exercise of this section, Fp corresponds to a normal distribution of
mean pcomp and standard deviation comp. The rms problem can then be expressed
as:
max
p
V (c; p 1; A 1) = (p  c) [A+ I (p  p 1)A 1]u+ EV (c0; p; A)
subject to
A = Sf (p; Fp)
u = (p=P ) 
Because of the non-convexity in the objective function around p 1, it is not pos-
sible to use perturbation methods. Instead, we solve this model using value function
iteration by dening grids for the marginal cost c, the previous price p 1 and the choice
variable p. Notice that in the version above, the state variable A 1 is redundant as
it is completely determined by p 1.
Figure 4.1 below shows a sample price path simulated using the model. For this
particular example, the parameter values are pcomp = P = 1:083, comp = 0:1,  = 0:5,
 = 5; and the marginal cost c follows a 5-point Markov chain with mean 1, standard
deviation 0:02 and serial correlation 0:8. The blue line represents the marginal cost
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Figure 4.1: Response of prices (green) to marginal cost shocks (blue).
while the green line is the evolution of the price series pt.
we bring attention to some of implications of our model. First, the price series in
less volatile than marginal costs. Second, the model generates naturally price sticki-
ness: the price series exhibits clear periods of inaction despite underlying changes in
the marginal cost. This implies that the markup, p c, exhibits signicant variations.
Third, price dynamics display something akin to the "rocket and feathers" pattern
documented in the literature (see Peltzman, 2000, for evidence of such pattern in a
large number of producer and consumer goods): at a certain point, when the markup
becomes too small, the price eventually shoots up rapidly. Then, as the marginal cost
goes back down, prices also fall but more slowly.
To understand the intuition behind these results, consider the following example:
starting from an equilibrium situation where all rms charge the same price, one
brand is hit at time t by an increase in its marginal cost. We analyze whether there
is an incentive for a particular rm to deviate and raise its price. For expositional
purposes we assume that the shopping cost s is epsilon small.
If the rm raises its price, it is able to maintain at least partially its initial markup
level. However, the price increase has a negative impact on quantity: along the
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extensive margin, this decision will lead all loyal customers who have a reference
price equal or lower than pt to compare brands. This set of "leavers" is not empty,
since consumers who bought from the rm for the rst time at t 1 at reference price
pt 1 will nd it optimal to pay the shopping cost, draw a new distribution of taste
shocks and look for the brand with the highest taste/price ratio. Of these unattached
shoppers, less than the usual number will choose the rm again since its price is now
higher. In addition, the rise in price will have a negative impact on the quantity sold
per consumer.
If the rm decides instead to keep its price constant it will retain its entire customer
base, at the expense of facing a lower markup. When the marginal cost increase is not
too large, price stickiness is the optimal pricing strategy: the seller accepts lower prot
margin in order to avoid losing a positive mass of customers to the competition. Also,
a price fall is a dominated strategy in this setting, as rms could have implemented
it the previous period before the marginal cost increase.
The previous exercise shows that the mechanism proposed can generate signicant
relative price stickiness, i.e. the rm may decide to keep its price constant when it is
the only one hit by the shock. To determine whether it also generates nominal price
rigidity, one needs to analyze the rms optimal price decision following a common
shock. We make a simple extension to the current model. The economy now alternates
between two very persistent aggregate states: in the high state, all nominal variables
(the marginal cost c, the mean of the price distribution of competing brands pcomp,
as well as the aggregate price level P ) are multiplied by a common factor ! > 1.
In order to focus on the impact of this pseudo-aggregate shock, the variance of the
idiosyncratic marginal cost is set to 0.
Figure 4.2 depicts the simulated values for the rms price (green), the marginal
cost (blue) as well as the average price of the competing brands pcomp(red) in an
environment where ! 2 f1; 1:05g. Notice that even if all other brands were to raise
their prices by 5%, in line with the marginal cost increase, the rm would have no
incentive to deviate from its current price. In other words, what is costly for the rm
is to lift its nominal price. This is because the margin that triggers search is the
di¤erence between the posted price and the reference price of the consumer, not the
relative posted price across brands in the current period. Eventually, with a larger
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Figure 4.2: Nominal price stickiness in response to aggregate shocks. Retailer price
(green), competitorsprices (red) and marginal cost (blue).
aggregate shock, the rm would nd it optimal to adjust its price to a new level.
One interesting implication of this nding is that rms have an incentive to com-
municate credibly to their customers that the shock is common to all brands. This
is because by doing so, the announcement will shift the consumersbeliefs about the
entire distribution of competing brands. Hence, if the customer believes that all prices
have gone up by x%, he will have no incentive to search.
Next, we implement a role for sales. We think of a sale coming from a fall in
the marginal cost, in line with Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) and scanner data studies
(see examples from Rotemberg, 2005, or Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2011).
In other words, at this point we do not try to model the reason why the supplier
implements these sales in the rst place. Here, a sale is extremely temporary (1
period), and retrieves 0.2 from the value of the current regular marginal cost. Figure
4.3 shows an example of a simulated price series:
This pattern for the price and marginal cost is very reminiscent of what can be
seen in the scanner data. Notice that even though rms are very reluctant to raise
prices, they have no problem passing through a signicant portion of the large fall in
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Figure 4.3: Sales in the baseline model. Price (green) and marginal cost (blue).
marginal cost. This is because loyal customers see this sale price as a bonus, and are
not inclined to search once the price goes back to its regular level.
4.2 A modied model with richer dynamics
The model of the previous section, while very clean, displays limited dynamics: since
consumers draw a zero search cost every other period, there is not much of a concept
of building a loyal customer base. In fact, in the simple version used for the numerical
exercise, the number of loyal customers that have been retained at time t will anyway
leave at time t + 1. One option is to increase the number of overlapping customer
vintages, but this would raise substantially the computational burden as it would be
necessary to keep track of the state variables m and pt  . Instead, we make the
model richer and more dynamic by implementing three simple modications to the
basic framework.
First, in every period a fraction  of loyal customers is hit by an exogenous shock
(e.g. zero search cost, advertising) that leads them to search and compare brands,
whether there has been a price increase or not. Second, in the event of a price increase,
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a fraction  of loyal customers shop and learn about the price distribution but decide
to stay with their home seller anyway. It could be for example because they realize
that their switching cost is too high. They will remain part of the customer base
until at least the following period. Finally, loyal customers draw a zero search cost
after two periods. Of them, a fraction  decide that they want to remain attached
to their home brand. More precisely, we assume that their taste shock (or some
exogenous switching cost) is such that the home brand remains the one with the
highest taste-to-price ratio.
In this context, it is necessary to keep track of the size of the rms customer base
and the optimization problem in recursive form becomes:
max
p
V (c; p 1; L) = (p  c) [A+ I (p  p 1) (1  )L+ I (p > p 1) (1  )L]u+ EV (c0; p; L0)
subject to
A = Sf (p; Fp)
L0 = A+ I (p  p 1) (1  )L+ I (p > p 1) (1  )L
Once again the problem is solved using value function iteration, with an additional
grid for the new state variable L. Any decision p, coupled with the initial state
(p 1; L), determines a unique customer base next period of L0. We simulate the
model with the following parameter values: S = 1,  = 5,  = 0:5,  = 0:1;  =
0:8;  = 0:5. The price distribution Fpb is time invariant with mean of pcomp = 1:1
and standard deviation 0:1. The marginal cost follows a 5-point Markov chain with
standard deviation 0:025 and serial correlation 0:8.
The top plot of Figure 4.4 shows the marginal cost (blue) and price (green) series
over 200 periods. The price change frequency is equal to 11:3% versus 45:8% for the
marginal cost series. In other words, prices are sticky as not all marginal cost changes
translate into price movements (see Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2011, for
supporting evidence). As seen earlier, the rm resists raising prices until the markup
is too small to bear, at which point the price is adjusted upward suddenly. Subsequent
downward movements in the marginal cost are met with smaller price decreases up to
a new sticky price level. The bottom plot shows the evolution of the customer base L
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic model. Top panel: price (green) and marginal cost (blue).
Bottom panel: new arrivals (green) and customer base (blue)
(blue) and the mass of new arrivals A (green). Price increases lead to signicant drops
in both the customer base and new arrivals. This should not be surprising: when the
price is raised it tends to be by a signicant amount (the median price increase is 10%
in this example). We can also see the customer base dynamics at play: after raising
its price, the rm attracts some new customers and slowly rebuilds its customer base,
to a lower level if the new price stabilizes to a higher level than the old price.
We now turn to the hazard function generated by our model. The hazard rate for
a given point t shows the probability that a price is changed after exactly t periods.
A basic Calvo model predicts that the hazard function is at (the probability of a
price change is not a function of how long since the last price reset), while a menu
cost model generally predicts an upward sloping pattern (a price that has been kept
constant for a long period is more likely to be changed). Empirically, Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) show that using CPI data, the hazard function initially declines
sharply become somewhat attening out (we reproduce their gure for processed food
below). Based on their simulations, they conrm that a simple menu cost model does
not appear to be able to match this type of pattern.
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Figure 4.5: Hazard functions from Nakamura and Steinsson (2009)
In Figure 4.6 we plot the hazard function for the parameterization described above.
The sharp decline in the hazard function in the rst few periods comes from the fact
that following a price increase, a retreat of the marginal cost will lead to gradual
declines in the price charged. This comes directly from the fact that the marginal
cost process does not include any trend ination, an assumption that we relax later
on. Beyond this initial sharp decline, there is another force at play: as the rm
refrains from increasing its price, it slowly builds up its customer base. But as loyal
customers become more and more prominent versus new arrivals every period, it also
implies that any price increase becomes relatively more costly. Therefore, the longer
the rm waits to raise its price, the less likely it is to do so in the future, all else
being equal. Also, it should be noted that in this version of the model with dynamic
customer base, a price change can occur at time t even though there has been no
movement in the marginal cost during this period. This stems from the role of the
customer base L as a state variable.
24
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
Figure 4.6: Hazard function from the model
4.3 Introducing trend ination
We now introduce trend ination. Our framework is an adaptation of the simple
partial-equilibrium menu cost model from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The pro-
duction function of the rm is given by
yt = ztLt
where the rm-specic productivity level has the following law of motion
log (zt) =  log (zt 1) + "t
The real wage rate is constant at Wt=Pt = w: The aggregate price level is exoge-
nous and uctuates around a trend
logPt+1 = + logPt + t
For simplicity, we assume that the average price of other brands pcomp is equal to the
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aggregate price level P every period, and that the variance of the within-category
price distribution is time-invariant. The rm knows P and z before choosing p.
We can write the real prot function for a given period as
 =
 p
P
  w
A
" A+ I (p  p 1) (1  )L
+I (p > p 1) (1  )L
# p
P
 
and the rms intertemporal problem expressed in real terms is
max
p
V

z;
p 1
P
;L

=
 p
P
  w
z
" A+ I (p  p 1) (1  )L
+I (p > p 1) (1  )L
# p
P
 
+ EV

c0;
p
P 0
; z0

subject to
A = Sf
 p
P
; Fp

L0 = A+ I (p  p 1) (1  )L+ I (p > p 1) (1  )L
log (z) =  log (z 1) + "
logP 0 = + logP + 
To solve this problem by value function iteration, we need to dene grids for the
three state variables. We approximate the dynamics of z and  by using nz- and n-
point Markov chains respectively (note that the uncertainty regarding P 0 is resolved
in the current period). We dene the new variable p^ = log
 
p 1
P

which allows us to
rewrite the problem as:
max
p
V (z; p^ 1; L; ) =

p^+ + 1  w
z
" A+ I (p^ 1   p^  ) (1  )L
+I (p^ 1   p^ < ) (1  )L
#
(p^+ + 1)  + EV (c0; p^0; z0; 0)
subject to
p^ 1 = log
p 1
P

; p^ = log
 p
P 0

A = Sf (p^+ + 1; Fp)
L0 = A+ I (p^ 1   p^  ) (1  )L+ I (p^ 1   p^ < ) (1  )L
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Figure 4.7: Introducing trend ination. Firm price (blue), marginal cost (red) and
aggregate price level (green).
and dene a linear grid for p^ (we need to make sure that the possible values of  are
on the support of the grid). Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of the optimal price, the
aggregate price level as well as the nominal marginal cost in a simulation from our
model. The rm resets its price to bring back its markup to some average desired level,
and there are extended periods of sticky prices at it does not respond to marginal
cost movements.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present a micro-founded mechanism which generates nominal price
rigidity and rationalizes rmsrevealed concerns about price changes potentially an-
tagonizing customers, without relying on concepts of altruism or fairness. The friction
stems from a basic fact: comparing products, brands or even stores takes time and re-
sources. In our model, consumers engage in price comparison only when they believe
doing so may lead them to a better brand. We show that modifying the consumer
problem along these lines generates signicant nominal price stickiness even in the
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case of economy-wide shocks. That is, even if all its competitors have been hit by a
similar positive shock, a rm is reluctant to raise its nominal price by fear of trigger-
ing search among its loyal customers. Not only are prices sticky, but we also argue
that the predictions of the framework are in line with some well documented features
of the data. In addition, the mechanism rationalizes rm strategies that appear puz-
zling in the context of a standard model. For example, in our environment there is an
incentive for the seller to publicize that a shock is common across brands in order to
minimize search among its customers. Also, since consumer search is triggered by a
change in the nominal price and other attributes are not observed on every shopping
occasion, it can be rational for a rm to keep prices constant but lower packaging size
to avoid an adverse reaction by its customer base.
Future work will look at the general equilibrium implications of this mechanism. In
addition, there are interesting extensions to be explored, such as the role of advertising
in this setup, the strategy of adopting price points and the possibility of multiple
equilibria.
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